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in this paper, we focus on Malaysia and develop a social simulation to study Malaysian political development in 
recent time, especially on the intense period of time leading to the thirteenth Malaysian general election (GE13), 
and up to a few months after its conclusion. 
The GE13 saw the incumbent government in Malaysia retaining its rule by winning around 60% of the seats, 
yet failing to capture the economically important states of Selangor and Penang, and winning only 47.3% of the 
popular vote. The election, in a country of 28 million people, where the Bumiputera (ethnic Malays and other 
indigenous groups) forms 60.3 per cent of the population, Chinese 22.9 per cent, Indians 7.1 per cent, and vari-
ous other immigrant groups making up the rest, saw a massive swing of Chinese and urban votes against the 
government.  
The ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN), comprised of the dominant United Malays Nationalist Or-
ganisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and 
several smaller parties. The opposition, the People’s Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat), led by former Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim, composed of the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR), the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS). 
The result was surprising (and disappointing) for many government supporters as the Prime Minister, Najib 
Razak, was seen to have spent many months carefully planning and spending for the election in an effort to re-
verse the trend seen in the twelfth general election, where the government lost for the first time since 1969, its 
two-third parliamentary majority. 
Adding further to the surprise was the fact that Najib Razak was seen by many to have actively pursued re-
forms, and these included repealing, replacing or amending liberty-inhibiting laws such as the Internal Security 
Act (ISA), taking steps towards improving minority educationi and educational opportunitiesii, and pursuing na-
tional integration through his 1Malaysia vision (Salleh 2010).  
So what went wrong (for the ruling party)? Blames have been placed on the Internet, pro-BN figures pointing 
to its polarizing effect, and pro-PR counterparts lauding its ability to open up democratic opportunities (see, for 
example, Subramaniam 2011). Observers, and Najib himselfiii, noted that in spite of all that BN had actually 
done and was doing for the nation, it had actually lost the propaganda war, especially in cyber space and espe-
cially where the Chinese and urban community were concerned. Some pointed that regardless of the Internet, 
BN agents were simply hopeless against PR's far more charismatic, resourceful and committed figuresiv. In fact, 
especially in cyberspace, BN was an underdog, outnumbered and outflanked by the thousands of opposition 
cyber-troopers bent on breaking BN's domination. Adding further to the problem (for BN), was the numerous 
factors, that the people, especially the middle-class, had to grapple with then, and these included especially in-
flation, rising crime rate and fluctuating educational quality.  
While the result was rationalized by some as a 'fair' and 'balanced' reflection of Malaysian's political realityv, 
especially worrying for responsible policy makers and community leaders was the divisiveness of politics that 
led up to the election. Politics at times reached down to the guttervi, marked by personal attacks and smearing, 
virile videos, malicious online posting, and blatantly one-sided news articles. And polarization, a sinkhole for a 
multiracial society such as Malaysia, ensued when electorates en mass could not differentiate fallacies from 
sound arguments, facts from half-facts, and took side fanatically based more on emotional perception planted in 
by politicians rather than sound reasoning. As put by Calvin Sankaranvii,“.. they will only see and hear what they 
want to see and hear – irrespective of the persuasiveness of argument and the strengths of facts to the contrary. 
To these people, truth is defined as news reports and facts that confirms and reinforces the pre-existing percep-
tion that has been deeply ingrained into their consciousness. Anything that doesn’t is automatically rejected as 
propaganda and lies.” Hence, while politics has been further democratized or liberalized in Malaysia en route to 
GE13, some aspects of it have been certainly less than healthy. 
Given the motivating factor being to understand the complexity of Malaysian politics within the stated time 
period, we state the research question being addressed in this exploratory paper as follows: Can the dynamics of 
Malaysian politics be captured in social simulation? Can we infer useful insight from the simulation? To address 
the question, we focus on the perception war in the run up to GE13. While there have been plenty of largely 
qualitative discussion on the subject, our hypothesis is that computer simulation would help to provide insights 
on the way and the factors that affect the way in which political belief spreads in Malaysian society. 
2. Related Work 
The work of Deffuant et al. (2002) bears some influence on this paper. In (Deffuant 2002), the authors modeled 
opinion dynamics in populations of agents with continuous opinion and uncertainty. The opinions and uncer-
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tainties were modified by random pair interactions. They proposed a model of interactions, called relative 
agreement model, where uncertainty as well as opinion could be modified by interactions. An extremist agent 
was characterized by a much lower uncertainty. In our work, noting the complexity of actual political opinions, 
we need to assume a more structured form for agent's opinion, one that embodies the notion of 'certainty' and re-
sistance to change, and as will be discussed later, we further complement to it a 'stubbornness' attribute. 
Other agent-based simulation work that focuses on opinion formation includes that of Mare and Latora 
(2007). They studied the dynamics of opinion formation within a game theoretic framework. The process of 
opinion formation was considered to be a decision making process. An agent could choose to maintain its opin-
ion or to change in accordance with that of another agent. While the work is theoretically interesting, it is un-
clear as to how it would map onto the context of interest in this paper. In another work, Iniguez et al. (2011) 
studied the propagation of opinions in a social network. An agent’s opinion is assumed to be a bounded scalar 
value, the value of which denotes the agent’s inclination (positive or negative) with regard to a particular issue. 
Links may be formed and deleted dynamically throughout a simulation. Links between agents may be deleted 
with a probability proportional to the opinion difference between the agents. Within the problem context of this 
paper, the incorporation of social networking would indeed be natural especially if one were to consider social 
media as a political medium. However, we choose in this paper to consider only broadly the role played by the 
Internet, a term under which we lump all the different communication tools: social media, news portal, blogs, 
forums, etc. Muis (2010) sought to explore, through simulation, the role of the media in electoral politics, and to 
explain as to why newer political parties find it difficult to gain ground in a democratic election. While the sim-
ulation result was consistent with empirical electoral data from a time period in the Netherlands from 1998 to 
2002, he assumed only traditional media, and did not consider the broadcasting capability of the Internet. 
Along a different dimension, Kottonau and Wostl (2004) focused on the formation of political attitude 
strength. A stronger attitude denoted the greater the probability an agent would participate in an election. The 
change in position due to the communication assumed depended largely on the certainty and credibility of the 
agents involved, and was dictated by what they called the PASS (Political Attitude Strength Simulation) model. 
The role of emotion was not considered. In the context of this paper, we need to capture the role of emotion, and 
further, due to the high voluntary turnout (90%) in GE13, and our own observation of a very high citizen partic-
ipation, the issue of attitude strength and politically awareness (Zaller 1992) plays a lesser role.  
A different sort of agent-based simulation is in Silverman et al. (2006). They discussed a political strategy 
game that simulated ethno-political conflicts. The game involved agents that belonged to one or more groups 
based on norms, sacred values, languages and such, each group competing for dominance and resource control. 
We do not consider resource competition in this paper, though such emphasis might be very relevant when con-
sidering Malaysian politics in a broader context. 
And as far as case studies are concerned, only a few work thus far can be classified as being under this cate-
gory. Geller et al (2011) focused on socioeconomic issues to explain how the Afghan drug industry was sus-
tained by its political players. Gulden (2012) applied a game-theoretic framework to study the cycle of violence 
in the Guatemalan Civil War, and showed, through simulations, the relationship between ethnic composition and 
the level of political violence in a specific zone. The work as presented in this paper, being very specific to the 
Malaysian political experience, may be categorized as a case study. It is important to note that while a case study 
might not directly contribute to the fundamentals of agent-based simulation or to political science itself, it serves 
to demonstrate the applicability or feasibility of using simulation to study a real-world problem, illustrating its 
usefulness, and possibly guiding further fundamental research. 
Figure 1: Proposed Framework 
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3. Framework 
The essence of our approach is depicted in Figure 1. Agents interact with one another, and each has a number of 
features, pertinent among which are emotion, communication skill and influence, stubbornness, and opinions 
structured in the form of a worldview or mental map. Multiple opinions persist in an agent, an emotional filter 
determining the one which is salient. Agents interact in order to propagate its belief, locally and at times globally 
using Internet broadcast. More details will be exposed in the sections to follow. 
3.1. Worldview Map 
We model the worldview of individuals in a simulated society using graphical network notation. A 
worldview depicts a person's thought process about how something works in the real world. It represents the 
surrounding world, and the relationships between its various parts. In the context of this paper, it serves a 
purpose similar to the cultural network analysis (CNA) in Sieck (2010, 2011) – it facilitates studying in de-
tail the common perspective that members of a culture bring to a situation. The specific form of the 
worldview that we assume is that which we consider to be the most common in the Malaysian political con-
text, and will be presented later.  
We represent a worldview map as an N-node tree. Each node, ni, in the map represents a notion or state-
ment. Each edge,{ },k ln n , connecting between 2 nodes, nk and nl ( 0 k N≤ < and 0 l N≤ < ), represents a 
link between two notions. It has a weight, wkl, 0 1klw≤ ≤ , that represents the strength of the connection be-
tween the concepts. A stronger weight denotes a strong argument for the connection, while a weak weight 
denotes otherwise. 
The overall weight of a map is obtained as the average over all the weights in the map, as follows: 
kl
totalw w W=  where W is the total number of edges or weights in the map. 
Political conflict ensues when different sides, having different worldview maps pertaining to an issue, 
communicate past one another. This means that two people can experience the same situation, but pay atten-
tion to entirely different things and take away different ideas about the causes and effects of an experience. 
In the context of Malaysian politics, it explains the continual dichotomy between opposing sections of 
societyviii. 
A network notation has two main advantages. First, it allows us to map out the thought systems of the 
opposing parties, allowing us to objectively understand the position of each. Secondly, the network notation, 
in computing terms, translates to standard tree data structure, allowing for efficient computation and simula-
tion, enabling understanding of the macroscopic behavior that emerges in society when ideas interact. 
 
3.2. Worldviews Assumed 
3.2.1 Disclaimer and Scope 
The author asserts that this paper is written with no intentional bias towards either the ruling party or the opposi-
tion in Malaysia. The goal is purely academic - to develop social simulation for the study of socio-political real-
ity in the country and to infer insights into her political development. 
The maps to be shown in the next sections were derived from various sources (mostly online) and the au-
thor’s personal observation in months leading to GE13, and up to a few months upon its conclusion. The author 
made observations through his interactions with various individuals (including family members and colleagues) 
with different political orientations, participation in online forums and debates, and years of following the Ma-
laysian political scenes. Hence, the maps are illustrative in purpose; its method of derivation a form of political 
ethnography, akin to the treatment in (Weiss 2013). A more rigorous approach, one which would be needed for 
an 'outsider' to understand a foreign society, would be something akin to Sieck’s cultural map analysis, a method 
that incorporates eliciting of ideas from people in interviews, extraction of ideas from interview transcripts, 
analysis of common ideas and alignment and assembling of common ideas into complete maps. 
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er than BN ever since independence, and the specter of the nation being torn apart once PR is in power proved to 
be overwhelming for many. 
3.3. The Simulation Framework 
In essence, the simulation framework is influenced by Zaller's (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model; a 
person keeps multiple views in its head, what kept being determined by her past consideration. At any particular 
moment, when its opinion is being called for, that which is salient at the moment will be retrieved and effective. 
We adapt the RAS model to fit in with Malaysian political reality, in particular, as mentioned before, reality as 
observed on the ground. 
Hence, in our simulation, an agent has both positive and negative schema in its mind - “UMNO/BN is bad”, 
denoted Sb, and “UMNO/BN is good”, Sg. The former is an anti-establishment position, and the latter 
pro-government. Both are latent in an individual. The scheme which is dominant, that is has more weight, de-
termines whether the agent is a PR or a BN supporter.  
An emotional filter determines the scheme that is salient at the moment. In fact, in a number of studies 
(Schemer et al 2007, Healy et al 2009), emotion has been shown to be an important determinant of political ori-
entation. While most of the studies were conducted in the context of developed nations, the author noted that it 
plays a significant role among the Malaysian electorates too, though not quite the same way as with an Ameri-
can electorate for example. A Malaysian with a high stress level, frustrated at the bureaucracy, angry and disap-
pointed, for example with perceived ethnically-driven unfairness or at the ever degrading public transport sys-
tem, is likely to detach himself from the establishment and side with an opposition party even though he or she 
might not actually fully endorse the party’s position. He or she is likely to start reading only opposition media 
channels from then on, searching for government’s wrong-doing to convince himself or herself that the govern-
ment is ‘bad’. Hence, the negative schema emerges especially in times of 'stress'. Still, the positive schema 
might re-emerge in “better days”. 
We further note that the 'stress' experienced by an agent may not be real, in the sense that it might not come 
from actual experiences, but it may in fact be imparted by propagandist media. In fact, the Internet can be used 
for both information and intentional misinformation. News articles, especially in the Internet, can be articulated 
to invoke certain emotion and circulated with little consideration for truth, with sometimes adverse effects on the 
emotion of the electorate. Hence, while the Internet certainly makes it easier for the activists involved to pursue 
their goals (Farrell 2012, Aday et al. 2010, Conover et al. 2010), through lowering of the cost of certain kind of 
collective actions, it allows as well for easier manipulation of the masses, and the materials produced in the 
words of (Drezner and Farrell 2008) can have a “knock-on consequence for the media and for politics”. And 
hence the distaste for it by some government figure, not just in Malaysia, but elsewhere as well, and notably the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan quipped, "There is now a scourge that is called Twitter. The best 
examples of lies can be found there. To me, social media is the worst menace to society.”  
We therefore associate with each agent an emotional state, e, – the level of emotion that it has for the gov-
ernment. The higher the emotional state, the happier the agent is with the authority. This is further illustrated 
below in Figure 4. As shown in the figure, we assume for each agent an emotional value between 0 and 1. A 
value above 0.5 indicates a pro-BN emotion, while that below an anti-BN (or pro-PR) feeling. A value of exact-
ly 0.5 can of course be construed as a totally neutral feeling. 
 
 
 
 
Further, we associate a certain stress level in each of the areas populated by agents. The stress level denotes 
the environment under which the agent is living, and this stress affects the agent's emotional state. In our ex-
periments, we assume two primary areas – urban and rural. Assuming a Malaysian scenario (might be true any-
where else), urban areas are more populated, and have a higher stress factor, and rural areas are relatively 
'stress-less'. The extent to which environmental stress affects an agent’s emotional state depends on its 
'stubbornness'. Stubborn agents will maintain its happiness or unhappiness despite the change in the environ-
mental stress.  
Agents are spatially distributed, each with a position{ },x y . And every agent attempts to influence other 
agents. Different agents have different level of influence, ifl, measured by a certain radius of influence. Influen-
tial agents, to be understood as politicians or individuals with high political interest and engagement, have a 
1.0 
Unhappy Happy 
0.0 
0.5 
Figure 4: Agent's emotion 
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higher radius of influence compared to others (the general public). In the actual Malaysian context, they would 
attempt to assert influence through various medium (Weiss 2013) - flags, posters, banners, billboards, political 
rally, walkabouts in markets, neighborhoods, etc., religious services, dinners, and so on. Further, we note the 
role of the Internet in allowing global communication - broadcasting to the entire population rather than just 
within a localized target; hence, in the simulation, at each interaction cycle, if an agent, with a probability bcasti, 
uses the media, its influence is set to be arbitrarily large. 
When an agent, the propagator, attempts to influence another agent, whether locally or globally (through In-
ternet broadcast), the chances of engagement depends on the similarity of emotional status between the two. An 
agent happy with the government is likely to engage with another of similar emotion, and similarly with an 
agent unhappy with the government. Consequently, a stressful agent is not likely to respond to a 'positive' influ-
ence - BN-oriented agent or view BN material, and likewise an agent already happy in “the way things work” is 
not likely to make itself interact with 'negative' material - PR-oriented agent or believe in PR material. Hence, 
emotion is assumed to affect attention, a relation documented in a number of works (for example Vuilleumier et 
al. 2003, Blanchette & Richards 2009). 
We further associate the notion of mobility with agents. Most agents are static; that is, they will stick to their 
spatial location, a situation akin to actual society where individuals have work and family to attend to and poli-
tics are not central in their life. But some agents are politically-centered individuals or “opinion leaders” 
(Lazarsfeld et al 1944), and they will move from one place to another in a direction{ },x yd d , wherever they see 
a chance to spread their influence. Preferential mobility together with selective openness to political discourse, 
facilitated as noted by (Sunstein 2002) by the Internet, lead people to become more “inward looking and ex-
treme”.  
The schema that the propagator engages the receiver on, either Sb or Sg., depends on the emotional states of 
the two. If both have the same emotional orientation, they will interact using the schema that matches its emo-
tion. For example, if both have PR-oriented emotion, then the schema chosen will be Sb. If they have different 
emotional orientation, then the active schema will be the one that matches the schema of the agent with the 
stronger emotion. If the emotional strengths are equal, the schema chosen will be randomly decided upon with 
equal probability. 
With the schema decided upon, the issue,{ },k ln n , within the chosen schema, is then randomly chosen, and 
the outcome of the interaction probabilistically depends on the communication skill, commsk, of each. If the re-
ceiver loses, it will be drawn closer to the opinion of the propagator. The actual amount of increase or decrease 
of conviction of the receiver on a particular issue depends on its emotional state. Specifically, if the interaction 
is over Sb, the receiver will be more inclined to reduce wkl if it is in a good emotional state, and to increase the 
value otherwise. On the other hand, if the interaction is over Sg, the receiver will be more inclined to reduce wkl if 
it is in a bad emotional state, and to increase the value if otherwise. 
It should be noted that due to the way we compute the overall weight in a map, as the average over all the 
weights in the map, the smaller the map, the greater would be the effect of any adjustment of weight. A simple 
example is as follows: Compare a map, S0, with just a single weight, that is with just 2 nodes, to a map, S1, with 
a hundred weights. A change of w∆ in the single weight in S0 would affect its overall weight more than the 
same change on a single weight in S1. Hence, the more complex a map, which means the more complex the pre-
disposition, the slower will be the impact of any change of weight on it, a property in line with Zaller's re-
sistance axiom (1992): People tend to resist, to some extent, arguments that are inconsistent with their political 
predispositions.  
Finally, it is important to note that in our simulation, we assume that any agent, even the staunchest supporter 
or party strongman, can be converted to the opposing side. While studies such as that done by Norris et al (1999) 
asserted that due to selective exposure and attention (or confirmation bias), at best, campaign can only reinforce, 
rather than change partisanship, to “reduce defections from the ranks”, the goal of many campaigns in Malaysia 
has been exactly that – to increase defections from the ranks. In fact, defections can involve even the most 
hardcore supportersxxxiii; individuals who used to be top party officials, or even top government leaders, have 
been known to defect to opposing parties. Hence, any agent, even the mobile ones, can be converted to the op-
posing side. 
In all, an agent, ai, has the following key attributes:  
• schemas: Sb(negative) and Sg (positive)  
• emotional states, ei  
• communication skill, commski 
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• stubbornness, stubi  
• radius of influence, ifli 
• Internet broadcast probability, bcasti 
• direction, diri 
• position,{ },i ix y   
 
At each time step, our agent simulation then works as shown in the following algorithm: 
For each time t: 
For each agent, ai  
Set direction diri to zero vector 
Based on its media broadcast probability, bcasti, determine randomly if ai is to broadcast. 
if ai is to broadcast, temporarily set its ifli to infinity. 
For every other agent, aj  
Compute the probability, ( ),d i jp a a , of ai engaging aj based on their distance apart: 
   
Compute the probability, ( ),e i jp a a , of ai engaging aj, based on the emotional similarity: 
  
Based on pd and pe, determine randomly if there is interaction between ai and aj. 
If there is no interaction, continue to the next agent, aj+1 
Based on emotional status, determine the schema, S, (either Sb or Sg,) that the agents will interact on.  
If both agents with similar emotion, accumulate to diri the direction from ai to aj 
Randomly decides on an issue{ },k ln n  within S to be discussed. 
Compute the difference in opinion between ai and aj on the issue:   
Determine the probability, pwin,i , of ai successfully influencing aj: 
  
Determine (in a similar way) the probability, pwin,j , of aj successfully countering ai. 
Based on pwin,i and pwin,j, randomly compute a boolean flag wini: wini is true if ai managed to influence aj, 
and aj did not succeed in countering back the influence. 
If wini is true: 
get random val, rval 
compute unhappinessj = 1 – emoj 
if S is equal to Sb 
if dj < 0 
compute incr = 1 – unhappinessj 
else  
compute incr = 1 – happinessj 
else 
if dj < 0 
compute incr = 1 – happinessj 
else  
compute incr = 1 – unhappinessj 
compute wklj = wklj + rval * incr * dj  
 
After each time step, we perform the following updates: 
• each agent, ai, is moved according to its accumulated motion direction, diri  
• the emotion, ei, for ai is perturbed based on the current environment stress factor, stress. The adjust-
ment, incr, is randomly proportionate to the inverse of the stubbornness, stubi, of the agent, as shown 
below: 
emo = 1 – stress 
emoDiff = emo - ei 
incr = random fraction * (1 – stubi) 
ei = ei + incr * emoDiff 
A brief note on the implementation: We implemented the algorithm above in the C language. While the ma-
jority of social simulation work appears to rely on higher-level tools such NetLogo (Gilbert and Troitzch 2005), 
we chose a lower-level language in order to take full advantage of the multicore platform where we run the ex-
periments. Running in parallel on the multicore platform, we were able to execute thousands of runs of the sim-
( ), 1 ( , )d i j i j ip a a dist a a ifl= −
( , ) 1e i j i jp a a e e= − −
, ,k l k l
j i jd w w= −
( ),win i i i jp comm comm comm= +
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ulation in a reasonable amount of time. The experiments are described in the next section. 
4. Experimental Results and Discussion 
The central political plot in the period of time surrounding GE13, as described early in the paper, pit an embat-
tled BN against a PR side manned by more competent politicians. Hence, we ran simulation experiments to ex-
plore various scenarios within that context. The key agents manipulated in the experiments were the mobile, po-
litically-centered agents - ntBN and proBN. The stubbornness values, and the initial values for emotion and posi-
tive opinions (which are proportional to the edge weights in the positive schema, and inversely to that in the 
negative schema), shown in Table 1, are chosen to differentiate between the two sides. The population sizes for 
both groups were variable, ranging in the experiment from 100 to 500. In conforming to the desired context, 
ntBN agents in general were assumed to have better communication skills compared to proBN; the average 
communication skills for proBN ranged with a value no more than 60 (out of 100), while that for ntBN at a value 
always higher than that for proBN.  
The general population, regardless of their political inclination, PR- (oppType) or BN-inclined (proType), had 
relatively low communication skill. The positive opinions of both oppType and proType were assumed to be 
completely random, with a uniform distribution in the range between 0 and 1. As can be seen in the table, there 
were more proType compared to oppType in the general population, with an approximate ratio of 60 to 40xxxiv. 
The differences between proType and bnType were namely where stubbornness and emotion were concerned, 
factors that we might loosely here attribute to political genes (Hatemi 2012). In fact, aside from differences due 
to background (Hing and Ong 1987, page 137 for example), BN-type and PR-type individuals, as with liberals 
and conservatives in American politics (Amodio et al. 2007), can sometimes be recognized based on differences 
in outlook or thinking stylexxxv, with the opposition-type individuals often perceived as being more likely to be 
more motivated (Weiss 2013) and entrenched in their positionxxxvi(hence the higher stubbornness value). In spite 
of the predisposition, it is important to note that, subject to the right setting, each individual may incline herself 
to either side, in the course of a political campaign. 
For all continuous random attribute values used in the experiment, the value for each agent was chosen ran-
domly using a Gaussian distribution that centered on the stated values and with a standard deviation 10% of the 
values. The total population was fixed at 10,000 and the number of time-step was limited to 50, indicating the 
time constraint under which either camp had to win over the other side. 
 
 
 
The size and population distribution for urban and rural areas were as shown in Table 2. As indicated in the 
table, more of the population was within the smaller urban area, creating an area with a population density much 
higher than that for the rural area. The figures in the table more or less reflected the actual figures for 
Malaysiaxxxvii. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 radius percent 
popsize 
Urban 1000 0.7 
Rural 7000 0.3 
 popsize mobility emo positive commsk stub 
ntBN 100 – 500 TRUE 0.2 0.2 > proBN 0.8 
proBN 100 – 500  TRUE 0.7 0.7 <= 0.6 0.5 
oppType 40% of others FALSE 0.2 * 0.2 0.7 
proType 60% of others FALSE 0.7 * 0.2 0.5 
 
PR-vote BN-vote PR BN 
Exp-1 9552 448 945 55 
Exp-2a 9416 584 928 72 
Exp-2b 6323 3677 477 523 
Exp-3a 8623 1377 939 61 
Exp-3b 8381 1619 917 83 
Exp-4 4302 5698 401 599 
 
BN with more 
 
ifl bcast gov 
Exp-1 
   
Exp-2a x 
  
Exp-2b x x 
 
Exp-3a 
  
x 
Exp-3b x 
 
x 
Exp-4 x x x 
Table 2: Urban & Rural Setting Table 1: Agent Parameters 
Table 4: Experimental Results Table 3: Experimental Setup 
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We performed 6 sets of experiments, each set comprising of 1000 runs. The factors being manipulated were 
indicated in Table 3; ifl corresponding to the influence level of the agents, bcast its broadcasting probability and 
governance corresponding to lower stress level in urban (citystress) and village area (vlgstress). In experiment 1, 
we made it be such that ntBN always had higher infl and bcast, and BN governance was poor (citystress being 
always more than 0.5). In experiment 2a, we made it be such that proBN always have higher ifl compared to that 
for ntBN. In experiment 2b, we increased BN's advantage by making proBN's bcast average being always higher 
than that for ntBN. We repeated the sequence of experiments in experiments 3a, 3b and 4, but with BN govern-
ance being always good in these rounds (both citystress and vlgstress less than 0.5). The results, to be elaborated 
upon in the subsections to follow, are shown in Table 4. 
 
Experiment Set 1: Resourceful ntBN vs Less Resourceful proBN  
The scenario was that of highly skilled and stubborn PR engaged agents, ntBN, up against less resourceful (low-
er influence range and broadcasting probability) BN agents, proBN, in a context where BN governed poorly. As 
shown in Table 1 (Exp-1), PR won emphatically. Two representative cases are shown in Table 5; though PR 
won 945 out of 1000 experimental runs, we chose one case where PR lost and one where it won. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While it may appear from the table that the number of agents (ntBN or proBN), popsize, played a significant 
role in determining the outcome, the value was actually randomly generated, and ntBN popsize was greater than 
proBN popsize in 499 out of the 1000 runs. Figure 5 shows for run 1 the number of conversion to PR made by 
each of the first 1000 agents during the first simulation iteration. A negative value indicates a conversion to the 
other side, i.e. to BN. Figure 6 shows the PR voters population dynamic during the first iteration. As can be seen 
in the figures, the key politically-active agents – ntBN and proBN –, forming the first few hundred agents (along 
the horizontal axis), played the major role in determining the dynamics of electoral conversion. Similar graph 
profiles are noted for the different runs in different experimental cases, and these will not be reproduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In reality, the PR routing of BN as depicted in Experimental Set 1 might be reflected in what Najib referred 
to as the 'Chinese tsunami'xxxviii in GE13, an en bloc voting by the Chinese against the ruling coalition. MCA 
being at a low point was seen to have to failed to campaign effectively among the Chinese population at a time 
when the community was seen to peak in its agitation and frustration, rightly or wrongly, with the government. 
 
Experiment Set 2a: BN improves Local Propaganda Machinery 
The situation in this set was similar to that in Experiment Set 1, but with proBN's radius of influence being al-
ways greater than that for ntBN. This would in reality be achievable for BN through greater investment in cam-
paign (propaganda) resources – more party workers, longer campaigning period, more banners, posters, more 
door-to-door visit, more gifts, etc. As shown in Table 4 (Exp-2a), while BN managed to increase the number of 
Run citystress vlgstress ntBN proBN PR BN 
popsize infl Commsk bcast popsize infl commsk bcast 
1 93 79 168 368 52 37 414 286 47 21 3994 6006 
2 83 91 424 382 38 31 260 238 13 24 10000 0 
Table 5: Representative Cases for Experiment 1 
Figure 5: PR conversion  
Figure 6: PR population dynamic during 
first iteration 
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times it wins – average of 584 votes per run up from 448 in the previous case, in general, it was still routed by 
PR. In spite of the greater ifl, the less charismatic (lesser commsk) proBN in the absence of good BN govern-
ance, managed to gain only a little more ground for BN.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two representative cases are shown in Table 6. Note that in run 1, though BN won, it won thinly compared 
to PR in run 2. Further, note that PR won big in run 2 even though rural stress (vlgstress) was only 33.  
 
Experiment Set 2b: BN improves Local and Global Propaganda Machinery 
The situation was similar to that in Experiment Set 2a, but with proBN's bcast average being always no less than 
that for ntBN. In other words, BN through certain media practice, fair or unfair (not unusual in a 
semi-democracy like Malaysia – see Schedler 2006, Heryanto and Mandal 2003), dominated and got to channel 
its propaganda further compared to PR, especially in the Internet.  
The effect was dramatic for BN, winning 523 out of 1000 runs, despite still losing the 'popular' vote, scoring 
3677 against PR's 6323 votes. Two representative cases are shown in Table 7. For run 1, note that even though 
proBN's bcast value was high, BN won only narrowly compared to PR for run 2. The margin with which BN 
was able to improve its win in this experimental set confirms the significance of the Internet in determining 
electoral swing, as per the discussion in Section 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment Set 3a: Repeat Experiment 1 but With BN Governing Better 
In this set, we considered a situation similar to that in Experiment Set 1, but with urban stress factor (citystress) 
and rural stress factor (vlgstress) both lower than 0.5 (or 50 in the table). This corresponds to the situation where 
the BN government manages to govern the country well enough to ensure low stress level in both the rural and 
the urban areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While we would expect good governance to translate into votes for BN, simulation results indicate otherwise. 
As shown in Table 4, BN won only 61 out of 1000 runs and had an average of only 1377 votes, an improvement 
though over its score in Experiment Set 1, The result shows is that though good governance may help BN, it will 
not do for the party if its proBN agents are inferior to ntBN. Two representative cases are shown in Table 8. Note 
that in run 2, BN still lost despite having larger popsize and with low citystress and vlgstress.  
An actual situation that paralleled the result here (at least contextually) might be the Worker Party victory in 
Singapore's Punggol East by-election in Jan 2013. In spite of the ruling party highly regarded governance, it 
failed to outdo the superiority of the opposition's skilled election machinery. 
run citystress vlgstre
ss 
ntBN proBN PR BN 
popsize infl commsk bcast popsize infl commsk bcast 
1 58 75 431 282 59 22 403 367 57 13 4141 5859 
2 55 33 313 406 68 42 345 495 52 15 9945 55 
run citystress vlgstress ntBN proBN PR BN 
popsize infl commsk bcast popsize infl commsk bcast 
1 73 93 489 45 66 9 401 62 27 40 4446 5554 
2 79 79 146 43 77 7 217 243 47 7 7073 2927 
run citystress vlgstress ntBN proBN PR BN 
popsize infl commsk bcast Popsize infl commsk Bcast 
1 41 24 250 132 33 10 444 47 27 9 3556 6444 
2 29 37 146 243 77 7 217 43 47 7 5328 4672 
Table 6: Representative Cases for Experiment 2a 
Table 7: Representative Cases for Experiment 2b 
Table 8: Representative Cases for Experiment 3a 
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Experiment Set 3b: Repeat Experiment 2a but With Better Governance 
In Experimental Set 3b, in a way similar to Experiment Set 3a, we repeated Experiment Set 2a but with BN 
showing better governance. A slight improvement was made over its result in Experimental Set 2a; BN register-
ing 1619 average votes and winning 83 runs. Two representative cases are shown in Table 9. In run 1, PR edged 
past BN in spite of its smaller population size. In run 2, a strong BN size with an almost equal bcast measure 
overran PR. 
 
Experiment Set 4: Repeat Experiment 2b but With Better Governance 
Finally, we ran experiments where BN had both better campaign and media machinery, and recorded better 
governance. In this experimental set, proBN always had ifl and bcast than that for ntBN, and the stress levels in 
both the urban and the rural areas were always less than 50 (out of 100).  
The result shows a stunning reversal of fortunes for BN; it won an average of 5698 average votes against 
PR's 4302, winning 599 runs and losing 401. Two representative cases are shown in Table 10. Note that in run 
1, the vlgstress (rural stress) was very low (3 out of 100); but PR won. In run 2, a bigger proBN population 
helped turned the tide against PR; it is unclear though if population size was the key determinant. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Insight from the Computer Experiments  
As noted in (Sodaro 2004, page 71), “the purpose of a model is not to represent reality perfectly but to enable us 
to understand reality by allowing us to compare it against some standard or pattern”. In fact, though a simulation 
that is only loosely based on actual parameters cannot be expected to mirror the reality exactly, from the results, 
we can draw the following conjecture: 
A ruling political party (or coalition) with agents less skilled in communication can maintain its position 
provided:  
1. it provides good living condition or good governance 
2. its agents make good use of the media (or media policy), especially the Internet, to reach out to the gen-
eral public further than the opposing parties. 
To conclusively prove the conjecture, field work and empirical analysis would certainly be required, and this 
is beyond the scope of the paper. However, there are evidences hinting at its truth. BN had its biggest electoral 
victory since 1978 in the 2004 11th General Election, a year marked by former prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, 
as “a transitional period, a time of high hopes”xxxix, and also the year when Malaysian Internet usage was only 
42.3 percent (compared to 65.8 percent in 2012). Considering the Internet to be the enabler for the opposition in 
Malaysia, it is evident that the “feel good” factor together with the opposition's lack of media access then al-
lowed a convincing win for BN. A further example is to the south of the country, in Singapore, where Shiang 
run citystress vlgstress ntBN proBN PR BN 
popsize infl commsk bcast popsize infl commsk bcast 
1 20 24 148 300 85 32 339 333 55 22 5216 4784 
2 47 43 301 249 62 24 358 396 42 23 3657 6343 
run citystress vlgstress ntBN proBN PR BN 
popsize Infl commsk bcast Popsize infl commsk bcast 
1 41 3 244 250 46 24 142 294 21 44 8523 1477 
2 29 15 140 246 88 23 314 355 41 43 3903 6097 
Table 9: Representative Cases for Experiment 3b 
Table 10: Representative Cases for Experiment 4 
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Neexl noted that the ruling PAP seems to have recognized that for it to maintain its support base, it needs taking 
“a harder line against dissent and resisting pressure for political reforms, but giving out more economic benefits 
for voters that count the most – the middle class”. “Harder line” here inevitably implies censuring of Internet 
media. 
 
5. Limitation and Future Work 
 
One limitation of the work is that we assume that everyone has access to the Internet. While the importance of 
the Internet has been highlighted by many in the literature and in the political circles, and confirmed in the sim-
ulation experiments, in actuality, not everyone in Malaysia has easy access to the medium. Those in the deep 
rural areas are not likely to tune to it, even if they do have the opportunities to do so, either out of cost concern 
or out of a simple preference for traditional, low-technology lifestyle. Hence, future work should consider 
low-technology group of agents. 
Also, we could have conducted a statistically more rigorous data analysis of the experimental results. For 
example, it would be interesting to study the statistical correlation between the various parameters manipulated 
within the experiments. We feel however that such analysis would be meaningful only when tied to an actual 
field study.  
Further, we note that the agent-based simulation as presented here can be extended to capture more of the po-
litical complexity in Malaysia. The role of political networking for example can be better captured in the simula-
tion, that being a significant factor especially in the rural electorate (Weiss 2013).  
Finally, though the use of worldview maps makes explicit the structure of the opinion of individual agents, to 
make the simulation more realistic, there should be an individual bias in the way in which an agent chooses and 
communicates on a topic when it is trying to influence another agent. It would then be interesting to see how the 
semantic of the opinion can possibly affect the simulation results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have presented an agent-based simulation model that describes the propagation of political perception or be-
lief in Malaysia. Worldview map is used as the token that represents political belief. Computational experiments 
were made using parameters inspired by the situation “on the ground”. The results obtained do point to the plau-
sibility of the model, at least in the qualitative sense. In essence, the work shows that it is possible to capture the 
dynamics of Malaysian politics in the form of social simulations. 
The results suggest a complex interrelation between the various parameters in the political setup, and it high-
lights the importance of the Internet in determining electoral swing. And most importantly, it suggests the im-
portance, for the ruling coalition, of both a strong political propaganda machinery and a strong governance in 
winning and maintaining the hearts and minds of the electorate. 
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